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ARIZONA SENATE BILL 1070, BRIGNONI, AND 
THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION:  
HAS THE UNITED STATES COMPLIED WITH  
ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS, AND SHOULD  
IT IN THE FUTURE?  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 21, 1965, in the midst of apartheid and extreme racial 
tensions throughout the world, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (―UN‖) signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (―CERD‖).1 CERD seeks to ―prohibit 
and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the 
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equality before the law.‖2 While the United States signed 
the treaty with significant reservations, understandings, and declarations,
3
 
the United States is a signatory and party to the treaty;
4
 therefore, it is 
obligated to comply with all provisions and eliminate federal and state 
legislation within that is contrary to the mandate of the treaty.
5
 
Almost forty-four years later, on April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted the 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, Senate Bill 
1070 (―S.B. 1070‖).6 This statute is one of the strictest and most far-
 
 
 1. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD] (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). Although CERD was a 
―convention,‖ it established the oldest treaty body in the world. Jose A. Lindgren Alves, Race and 
Religion in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 42 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 941, 947 (2008). Treaty bodies, like the Committee, monitor the implementation of international 
covenants or conventions. Id. While the Committee is a separate and distinct organization from a UN 
treaty body, it does meet in Geneva twice a year for three-week sessions. Id. at 948.  
 2. CERD, supra note 1, art. 5. 
 3. See infra Part IV (discussing the U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations to 
CERD). 
 4. See Declarations and Reservations to the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Mar. 7, 1966), http:// 
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-2.en.pdf [hereinafter CERD 
Declarations and Reservations]. 
 5. CERD, supra note 1, art. 2 § 1(d). Parties must ―prohibit and bring to an end, by all 
appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any 
persons, group or organization.‖ Id. (emphasis added). 
 6. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051 (2010) (allowing law enforcement officers to stop any 
individual when a ―reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in 
the United States‖). 
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reaching immigration laws in effect in the United States.
7
 The law greatly 
increases the ability of state and local law enforcement to inquire into an 
individual‘s immigration status, and it broadens the power of Arizona law 
enforcement to carry out federal immigration laws against illegal 
immigrants.
8
 Immigration enforcement, however, is an area reserved 
exclusively for the federal government.
9
  
Supporters of the Arizona law believe that the federal government has 
neglected to enforce immigration laws,
10
 a belief fueled by several 
perceptions about illegal immigration. One perception is that Arizona is 
simply overrun with foreigners who are breaking the law by immigrating 
illegally.
11
 The statistics used to support this perception often use 
somewhat simplistic methods.
12
 Another perception is that uncontrolled 
immigration leads to higher crime rates,
13
 a perception that is supported by 
Hispanic U.S. citizens‘ and Hispanic immigrants‘ involvement in drug 
trade
14
 as well as human and drug smuggling in the United States.
15
 Others 
 
 
 7. See Randall C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
23, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html (describing 
the law as the ―broadest and strictest immigration measure in generations‖). Ironically, for the past six 
years, Arizona has been home to the fourth largest number of refugees in the United States. See Jason 
DeParle, Arizona is a Haven for Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A11, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/us/09refugees.html. 
 8. See generally § 11-1051. 
 9. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–09 (1889), Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893). 
 10. Ginger Rough, Ariz. Asks High Court to Rule on SB 1070, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 11, 2011, 
http://tucsoncitizen.com/arizona-news/2011/08/11/ariz-asks-high-court-to-rule-on-sb-1070/ (―It‘s not 
like immigration is an area of absolutely exclusive federal control, and with Arizona bearing such a 
disproportionate burden (of the immigration problem), a one-size-fits-all solution doesn‘t make 
sense.‖) (quoting Paul Clement, attorney for Arizona governor Jan Brewer). 
 11. DeParle, supra note 7 (―[Arizona] officials rage at what they have called the ‗invasion‘ of 
illegal immigrants.‖). 
 12. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL FIX, URBAN INSTITUTE IMMIGRATION 
STUDIES PROGRAM, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND FIGURES (2004) (stating that 
undocumented immigration statistics are calculated by subtracting the totals for legal foreign-born 
residents from the total of foreign-born residents, in which legal foreign-born residents are legal 
permanent residents; refugees, asylees, and parolees; and legal temporary residents). A non-profit 
research organization, the Center for Immigration Studies, estimated that the undocumented immigrant 
population in the United States in 2009 was 10.8 million. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN 
JENSENIUS, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, A SHIFTING TIDE: RECENT TRENDS IN THE ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION POPULATION (2009), http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/shiftingtide.pdf. This number 
shows a decline from 12.5 million in 2007. Id. 
 13. IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, Q&A GUIDE TO STATE 
IMMIGRATION LAWS (2011), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
Guide_to_State_Immigration_Laws_042611_updated.pdf (finding that while the immigrant population 
in the U.S. almost tripled from 1990 to 2008, crime rates fell by almost forty percent; rates also fell in 
border cities and cities with large immigrant populations). 
 14. William Booth & Nick Miroff, Wiretaps Show Mexican Drug Ring Set Up in U.S., 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.pressherald.com/news/nationworld/wiretaps-
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believe that high rates of immigration hurt the U.S. economy and decrease 
the number of jobs available to U.S. citizens.
16
 
In response to these concerns, S.B. 1070 allows Arizona law 
enforcement officers to conduct a ―lawful stop, detention or arrest‖ if a 
―reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien,‖ and the officers 
must make an attempt to determine the person‘s immigration status before 
the person is released.
17
 The law originally stated that officers cannot 
―solely‖ rely on race when determining whether a reasonable suspicion 
exists to inquire into citizenship status,
18
 which raised concerns that 
officers would use racial profiling in enforcement.
19
 In response, S.B. 
2162 amended S.B. 1070 to prohibit law enforcement officers from taking 
into consideration ―race, color or national origin‖ when deciding whether 
to conduct an immigration stop.
20
 Even as amended, however, the law 
allows the use of race ―to the extent permitted by the United States or 
Arizona Constitution.‖21 Proponents of S.B. 1070 insist that the statute 
explicitly forbids the use of race in immigration enforcement; however, as 
Part II discusses, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit the use of race in 
immigration enforcement. 
 
 
show-mexican-drug-ring-set-up-in-u_s__2010-10-20.html (―U.S. law enforcement officials say the 
most worrisome thing about the Fernando Sanchez Organization [a Mexican drug ring] was how 
aggressively it moved to set up operations in the United States, working out of a San Diego apartment 
it called ‗The Office.‘‖). 
 15. See Lexington, Arizona, Rogue State, THE ECONOMIST, July 31–Aug. 6, 2010, at 25, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16693713. 
 16. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN‘S DOOR—IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 63 (1999). Borjas finds that while there may be weak or ambivalent statistical evidence 
regarding the effects of immigration on American wages, immigration could both drive wages down 
and attract new jobs as more businesses open to take advantage of cheap labor. Id. at 63, 67. 
 17. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 
 18. For a graphical view of the changes from S.B. 1070 to S.B. 2162, see House Bill 2162, 
ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/49leg/2r/ 
bills/hb2162c.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
 19. See Archibold, supra note 7. 
 20. Section B of S.B. 1070 states: 
For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by a law enforcement official or a law 
enforcement agency of this state . . . in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a 
county, city or town or this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien 
and is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when 
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person, except if the determination 
may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Any person who is arrested shall have the person's 
immigration status determined before the person is released. . . . A law enforcement official 
or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state may 
not consider race, color or national origin in implementing the requirements of this 
subsection except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution. 
§ 11-1051(B) (emphasis added).  
 21. § 11-1051(B). 
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This Note explores to what extent constitutional jurisprudence permits 
the consideration of race in immigration enforcement.
22
 Part II discusses 
the history of racial profiling in U.S. immigration law; Part III reviews 
international law relating to racial profiling, specifically CERD; Part IV 
examines the United States‘ and Europe‘s adherence to and compliance 
with CERD; and Part V analyzes the value and costs of using racial 
profiling in immigration law. In conclusion, this Note discusses whether 
the United States should remain a party to CERD and fully implement its 
provisions or withdraw. 
II. HISTORY OF RACIAL PROFILING  
IN THE CONTEXT OF U. S. IMMIGRATION LAW 
American case law pertaining to racial profiling involves profiling in 
both domestic criminal and immigration contexts. The Supreme Court 
decision in Whren v. United States
23
 marked a turning point in the use of 
racial profiling in the domestic criminal context. Whren held that as long 
as reasonable, objective, probable cause to stop an individual exists, the 
actual motives or subjective intent of law enforcement in conducting the 
stop will not affect the constitutionality of the stop.
24
 While the Whren 
decision might be more efficient than requiring a court to determine the 
subjective intent of the officer, some scholars believe that the Court in 
Whren adopted a policy of ―color-blind racism‖ that merely increased the 
power of the police to discriminate in law enforcement.
25
  
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration‘s War on Drugs26 increased the 
degree to which individuals and immigrants of Latino descent were 
 
 
 22. Issues related to S.B. 1070, such as federal law preemption, are outside the scope of this Note 
unless related to the use of race in immigration enforcement. For the District Court of Arizona ruling 
regarding the issue of preemption and enjoining several provisions of S.B. 1070, see United States v. 
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010). For an in-depth discussion of the constitutional issues 
raised by S.B. 1070, see COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, N.Y. CITY BAR, REPORT 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW S.B. 1070 (2010). 
 23. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 24. Id. at 814–15. Justice Scalia examines the difficulties in determining subjective and objective 
intent of officers when considering the reasonableness of a stop, but his analysis upholds the Fourth 
Amendment requirement of objective probable cause: ―For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely 
is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause 
justifies a search and seizure.‖ Id. at 819. 
 25. KAREN GLOVER, RACIAL PROFILING RESEARCH, RACISM, AND RESISTANCE 25 (2009) 
(stating that color-blind racism in Whren ―dismissed the salience of race in contemporary times and 
established greater latitude for police powers that have been used historically and contemporarily to 
oppress communities of color‖). 
 26. See FRED PAMPEL, RACIAL PROFILING, LIBRARY IN A BOOK 12 (2004). 
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targeted by racial profiling.
27
 President Nixon created the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in 1973,
28
 but large amounts of cocaine were 
still being brought into the United States from Latin America despite U.S. 
efforts.
29
 A media frenzy surrounded the use of crack and its impact on 
U.S. citizens, which consequently increased pressure on the police to stop 
the flow of illegal drugs.
30
 
A recent context in which racial profiling has been at issue is the 
profiling of persons of Middle Eastern descent after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. Unlike profiling used to detect general criminal 
behavior in which no specific suspect was previously identified, the 
hijackers on September 11 were all of Middle Eastern descent
31
 and 
therefore more readily fit a profile.
32
 As one scholar noted, ―The facts 
relating to terrorism remain clear: Islamic anti-American terrorism almost 
by definition involves Muslims from the Middle East or Asia. A system of 
random screening that ignores this fact can easily miss potential 
terrorists.‖33 Similarly, in the context of immigration in Arizona, 
immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border illegally are more likely 
Hispanic.
34
 Therefore, as with terrorism, there is a higher correlation 
between race and illegal-border crossings than between race and general 
criminal behavior. 
 
 
 27. Id. Scholars note that Hispanics have been treated more harshly than whites by law 
enforcement throughout the 1900s for a number of reasons. For instance, Border Patrol would allow 
illegal immigrants into the country for crop harvesting but then deport the immigrants once the harvest 
was over. Ramiro Martinez, Jr., Revisiting the Role of Latinos and Immigrants in Police Research, in 
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 435, 438–39 (Stephen K. Rice & 
Michael D. White eds., N.Y. Press 2010). 
 28. PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 12. 
 29. Id. Pampel notes that the involvement of Latin American military leaders and politicians as 
well as the wide-spread use of cheap, powerful crack cocaine made the drug trade of particular concern 
to U.S. government officials and the public at large. Id. 
 30. Id. at 13. Pampel states that in 1985 only one percent of Americans felt that drugs were the 
most important problem in America, but by 1989, sixty-four percent saw drugs as the most important 
problem in America. Id. 
 31. Kevin Sack with Jim Yardly, After the Attacks: The Suspects; U.S. Says Hijackers Lived in 
the Open With Deadly Secret, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1. 
 32. PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 22. 
 33. Id. Pampel notes that Israel has profiled young Arab men at its airports and that no airplane 
has been bombed there for more than thirty years. Id. 
 34. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975) (―The likelihood that any 
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant 
factor.‖). Scholar Victor Romero analyzes Justice Powell‘s finding that race is relevant in an 
immigration stop. Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: “Driving While Mexican” and Affirmative 
Action, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 201–04 (2000). Romero believes that Powell‘s approach is practical 
and recognizes our ―[race] conscious society‖ and the ―high correlation‖ between the appearance of 
one‘s race and immigration status. Id. at 203. 
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In light of the relevance of race in illegal immigration, several 
important cases have established broader boundaries for the acceptable use 
of racial profiling in the context of U.S. immigration enforcement. In 
1975, the Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
35
 established 
that law enforcement may consider ―appearance‖ as one of many factors 
when determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists to inquire into an 
individual‘s immigration status.36 The Court in Brignoni clearly stated that 
appearance alone cannot sustain a reasonable belief as to one‘s 
immigration status and limited U.S. Border Patrol powers to conduct 
arbitrary stops.
37
 The Court, however, explicitly condoned racial profiling 
by deeming race a ―relevant factor.‖38 
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in United States v. Montero-
Camargo
39
 found the Brignoni factors no longer applicable.
40
 Given the 
large size of the Hispanic population in the Southwest, the court stated that 
Hispanic appearance is ―of little or no use‖ to law enforcement when 
garnering a reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory immigration 
 
 
 35. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The defendants in the case were driving on a highway on which there 
was a closed immigration checkpoint, and two officers were observing traffic from their car. Id. at 
874–75. The officers spotted the defendants‘ car and admitted that they stopped the defendants solely 
because the ―three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent.‖ Id. at 875. When the officers 
questioned the occupants and discovered that the two passengers were non-citizens who had entered 
the country illegally, all three occupants were arrested. Id. 
 36. Id. at 884–85 (finding that ―[a]ny number of factors may be taken into account in deciding 
whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area‖ including ―proximity to the 
border,‖ ―usual patterns of traffic on the particular road,‖ ―previous experience with alien traffic,‖ 
―recent illegal border crossings in the area,‖ ―[t]he driver‘s behavior,‖ ―[a]spects of the vehicle,‖ 
whether ―[t]he vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded . . . [or] have an extraordinary number of 
passengers,‖ or someone ―observe[s] persons trying to hide‖). In addition, trained officers may use 
―the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as the mode of 
dress and haircut.‖ Id. at 885. 
 37. Id. at 882–83. The Government in Brignoni urged the Court to define the authority given to 
Border Patrol agents in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) to include the power to conduct vehicle stops without 
reasonable suspicion or a violation, but the Court declined. Id. The Court explained, ―Except at the 
border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware 
of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant 
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.‖ Id. at 884. 
 38. Id. at 886–87. The following year the Court implicitly affirmed Brignoni in stating that 
―apparent Mexican ancestry‖ was not a prohibited factor to use when deciding when to detain a 
suspect at the border. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). 
 39. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). In Camargo, the Hispanic defendants were detained after they 
made U-turns on a highway before a Border Patrol facility. Id. at 1126. The facility had previously 
been closed but had re-opened. Id. at 1127. The defendants made the U-turns after passing a sign 
stating the facility was open, and they stopped in the only place on the highway where the view from 
the facility was obstructed, a place which also was commonly used to drop off and pick up 
undocumented immigrants and illegal materials. Id. In addition to this behavior, the two cars were 
driving in tandem and had Mexicali license plates. Id. at 1128. 
 40. Id. at 1133. 
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stop.
41
 The court considered the reasoning in Brignoni but found the 
reasoning outdated.
42
 In its ruling, the court stated definitively that race 
cannot be used as a factor to question someone‘s immigration status.43 
While the reasoning in Brignoni still stands as law in the United States, 
many courts have followed the reasoning in Carmargo.
44
 
Scholars have debated the impact of the reasoning in Brignoni on 
American immigration jurisprudence.
45
 Some believe that the Brignoni 
reasoning is the minority view;
46
 however, many believe that Brignoni has 
set a dangerous and broad precedent that could allow for the use of race or 
national origin in profiles outside the immigration context.
47
 Some have 
 
 
 41. Id. at 1133–34. 
Brignoni-Ponce was handed down in 1975, some twenty-five years ago. Current demographic 
data demonstrate that the statistical premises on which its dictum relies are no longer 
applicable. The Hispanic population of this nation, and of the Southwest and Far West in 
particular, has grown enormously—at least five-fold in the four states referred to in the 
Supreme Court‘s decision . . . . Accordingly, Hispanic appearance is of little or no use in 
determining which particular individuals among the vast Hispanic populace should be 
stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens. Reasonable suspicion 
requires particularized suspicion, and in an area in which a large number of people share a 
specific characteristic, that characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part in a 
particularized reasonable suspicion determination. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 42. Id. at 1132–33 (finding the Census Bureau data relied on in Brignoni to be significantly 
different from current data at the time of the case). Anthony Cortese, in his essay concerning 
international and interdisciplinary studies of racial profiling, also notes that statistics of undocumented 
immigrants have changed markedly since the Brignoni ruling: ―Now, Latinos constitute a much 
large[r] percentage of the legal U.S. populations and represent a smaller percentage of the 
undocumented people . . . . In 1975, Mexican immigrants were 85% of undocumented citizens–
compared to 56% in 2005. The majority of Latinos in the United States are citizens.‖ Anthony J. 
Cortese, Racial Profiling Along Borders, in RACIAL PROFILING AND BORDERS: INTERNATIONAL, 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 71, 90 (Jeff Shantz ed., 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 43. Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1135. The court does mention, however, that race may be used when 
―relevant,‖ giving as an example that race may be used as one of many factors of a reasonable 
suspicion when a suspect has been identified as being of a particular race. Id. at 1134 n.21. 
 44. See Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling’s Enabler: High Court Ruling Underpins 
Arizona Immigration Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15 [hereinafter Chin & Johnson, 
Profiling’s Enabler], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/ 
AR2010071204049.html (discussing how Brignoni has been ―out of the constitutional mainstream‖ 
but could still greatly expand the ability for law enforcement officers to use racial profiling under S.B. 
1070). 
 45. Compare id. (finding that Brignoni has had a limited impact on racial profiling in 
immigration, even if the potential impact is large), with Kevin Johnson, The Case Against Race 
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 694 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson, The 
Case Against Race Profiling] (stating that Brignoni has had broad influence on racial profiling in 
immigration law). 
 46. See Chris & Johnson, Profiling’s Enabler, supra note 44 (―As for the legal system as a 
whole: Brignoni has been exceptional and out of the constitutional mainstream since it was decided.‖).  
 47. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling, supra note 45, at 693–94 (finding that Brignoni‘s 
reasoning, that Mexican appearance is relevant but not alone enough to sustain an immigration stop, 
has greatly shaped immigration enforcement). While Johnson‘s comments in this article might seem 
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agreed with the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning in Camargo that ―Mexican 
appearance‖ is no longer useful or an accurate criterion to use when 
deciding whether to conduct an immigration stop because individuals of 
Mexican descent have varied appearances and cannot be identified using a 
recognizable stereotype.
48
 In addition, there is some evidence that Mexican 
immigrants overstay their visa periods at a far lower rate than immigrants 
from other countries.
49
 Combined with Carmargo‘s reasoning that the 
factors used in the Brignoni decision are no longer workable given the 
current immigrant populations, there are a number of persuasive reasons to 
limit the application of Brignoni. 
Arguably, the Court in Brignoni could have taken a Whren-like 
colorblind approach, finding that any objective violation makes an 
immigration stop reasonable,
50
 but perhaps the Court wanted to give law 
enforcement even broader discretionary power to enforce immigration 
laws if a totality of certain circumstances exists. Alternatively, the Court 
could have taken a Camargo-like approach, recognizing the correlation 
between race and citizenship status
51
 but still forbidding the use of 
 
 
inconsistent with his comments in Chin & Johnson, Profiling’s Enabler, supra note 44, Brignoni could 
have greatly impacted the power of immigration enforcement officials while also being a minority-
view case. See also PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 8 (finding that the Supreme Court in Brignoni did not 
explicitly rule that race could be used in broader profiles, but the Court set the precedent in the 
immigration context that could lead the way for broader constitutional use of racial profiling). 
 48. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling, supra note 45, at 714–15. Johnson argues that 
there is not a singular ―Hispanic appearance‖ and notes that many Hispanic people can have blond 
hair, red hair, blue eyes, and hazel eyes. Id. at 715. In addition to problems with appearance itself, the 
author comments on appearance in mixed-status families:  
To further complicate matters, ―nearly 1 in 10 U.S. families with children is a mixed-status 
family, that is to say, a family in which one or more parents is a noncitizen and one or more 
children is a citizen.‖ Thus, a nuclear family with ―Hispanic appearances‖ may have members 
with different immigration statuses, thereby making enforcement efforts based on physical 
appearance more problematic. Moreover, due to family ties, some undocumented persons in 
these families are eligible to become lawful permanent residents.  
Id.  
 49. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1997 INS 
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 199 (1997) (finding that while sixteen percent of the Mexican undocumented 
population overstayed visas, twenty-six percent of Central American undocumented immigrants have 
overstayed visas and ninety-one percent of undocumented immigrants from all other countries outside 
Mexico and Central America have overstayed visas). The INS findings, however, need to be assessed 
in light of the fact that most Latin American individuals are not granted travel visas unless there is 
evidence of intent to return to the home country. Such evidence could include children or property in 
the home country. 
 50. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (2006). 
 51. This approach could fit under Critical Race Theory, which recognizes that racism is part of 
normal society, culture is self-interested, and dominant groups will allow or encourage the 
advancement of other races when it is in the dominant group‘s best interest. Romero, supra note 34, at 
204. In the context of Brignoni-type stops, Romero suggests that using race would serve only to 
―perpetuat[e] the continuation of racial oppression through the reinforcement of a stereotype and 
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profiling due to the potential for racial profiling to violate the rights of 
both citizens and non-citizens.
52
 Under this approach, the Court could have 
mandated the use of race-neutral immigration laws that, even if much less 
effective, afford greater protection under the Constitution
53
 and comply 
fully with the United States‘ obligations under international law.54 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST RACIAL PROFILING: CERD  
Under CERD, all forms of racial profiling are prohibited regardless of 
their use or effect. CERD, however, does relax its obligations on states in 
immigration law. In particular, CERD notes that it ―shall not apply to 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party 
to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.‖55 One reason for 
this distinction could be that CERD was enacted during a neo-colonial 
period in the height of apartheid in South Africa.
56
 At the time of drafting, 
the focus of the UN was on discrimination between different races of 
citizens within a country rather than discrimination between citizens and 
non-citizens.
57
 An alternative explanation is that states have sole control 
over their immigration law, and the treaty had to recognize this sovereign 
power in order to be ratified.
58
 However, CERD does directly state in its 
 
 
harassment of a marginalized ethnic group.‖ Id. Romero notes, however, that Critical Race Theorists 
might support the use of race in affirmative action programs giving minorities more educational and 
employment opportunities, in contrast to using race as a reason for law enforcement to be suspicious of 
minorities‘ immigration statuses. Id. at 205. 
 52. See Arizona, Rogue State, supra note 15 (―Barack Obama said in April that the law raised the 
spectre of Hispanic Americans being harassed when they took their children for ice cream.‖). While 
the Court in Brignoni recognizes an empirical relationship between race and undocumented status, the 
Brignoni opinion lacks normative analysis on whether constitutional law should recognize and accept 
this correlation and risk encouraging racial profiling. Romero, supra note 34, at 203. 
 53. Romero suggests ―making race a factor for all by making it a factor for none‖ and stopping 
every motorist at the border. Romero, supra note 34, at 205. This solution, while based on a racial 
standard, seems unworkable, especially at some high-traffic borders. 
 54. See infra Part III. 
 55. CERD, supra note 1, art. 1, § 2. 
 56. Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of 
International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 581–82 
(1997). 
 57. Id. at 582. McDougall notes that, although there were highly contentious Cold War-
influenced debates over which countries had caused the severe racial discord in Africa, there was very 
little debate over the definition of racial discrimination in CERD. Id. The definition of racial 
discrimination was taken largely from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) definition and from the International Labor Organization (―ILO‖) definition. 
Id.  
 58. Even though CERD recognizes the autonomy of states to determine their immigration laws, 
the Committee‘s Concluding Observations have often taken note of parties‘ compliance with 
international law regarding the treatment of non-citizens. See David Weissbrodt, The Approach of the 
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recommendations that racial discrimination cannot be used in the 
immigration context, regardless of state power over immigration law.
59
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (―the 
Committee‖), a treaty body, was created to implement CERD, monitor 
parties‘ progress, and review individual complaints.60 Parties to the treaty 
are required to report periodically on their compliance and implementation 
of the treaty.
61
 The Committee reviews these reports and issues 
observations and recommendations on states‘ progress.62 These 
observations and recommendations are considered official jurisprudence 
on the treaty.
63
  
IV. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN ADHERENCE TO CERD SINCE 
RATIFICATION 
CERD came into force in the United States on November 20, 1994,
64
 
but with extensive reservations, understandings, and declarations 
(―RUDs‖).65 The U.S. RUDs state that CERD is not a self-executing 
treaty
66
 and therefore does not establish a private right of action.
67
 In 
 
 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to Interpreting and Applying International 
Humanitarian Law, 19 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 327, 341 (2010). But see General Recommendation 30, 
Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD, 64th Sess., Feb. 23–Mar. 12, 2004, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (May 4, 2005) [hereinafter CERD General Recommendation 30]. 
 59. CERD General Recommendation 30, supra note 58, ¶ 7 (stating that parties must ―[e]nsure 
that legislative guarantees against racial discrimination apply to non-citizens regardless of their 
immigration status, and that the implementation of legislation does not have a discriminatory effect on 
non-citizens‖).  
 60. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Non-Citizens: National 
Security and International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 187 (2005) (outlining the 
Committee‘s roles and duties and finding that the Committee reviews each of the state parties‘ reports 
on their compliance with CERD, issues general recommendations to the General Assembly, reviews 
complaints of state parties that other parties have violated the treaty, and reviews individual complaints 
of state party violations if a party recognizes a private right of action under the treaty); see also 
Weissbrodt, supra note 58, at 332. Note that while it is possible for an individual to submit a complaint 
to the Committee, the United States does not recognize a private right of action under the treaty. See 
infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 61. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL‘Y 
REV. 257, 282 (2009). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. It should be noted that there is no enforcement mechanism for the Committee‘s 
recommendations, nor are there sanctions for parties‘ lack of compliance. Id. 
 64. Fellner, supra note 61, at 258 n.3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at ch. III. 
 67. See Tucker v. N.Y. Police Dept., 2008 WL 4935883, at *13 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2008) (finding 
that CERD is neither self-executing nor has it been enacted domestically through enabling legislation); 
Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (agreeing with other district courts that 
CERD is not self-executing and does not give rise to a private right of action); United States v. Perez, 
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addition, the RUDs also state that the International Court of Justice will 
have jurisdiction over the United States only with the federal 
government‘s consent.68 The RUDs qualify and amend the U.S. 
ratification of CERD to such an extent that one scholar believes that the 
ratification was simply ―rhetorical commitment‖ instead of a true 
dedication to all terms of the treaty.
69
 The RUDs could also go so far as to 
violate the ―object and purpose‖ of the treaty.70 
Notably the RUDs claim that the U.S. Constitution provides 
―extensive‖ protections of individual liberties,71 but these protections 
might not reach as far as the United States claims. CERD explicitly 
prohibits racial discrimination ―in purpose or effect‖72 and appears to 
reach both facially discriminatory and facially neutral laws.
73
 In contrast, 
U.S. jurisprudence does not treat facially discriminatory laws with the 
same scrutiny as facially neutral laws,
74
 so CERD offers stronger 
 
 
2004 WL 935260, at *17 (D. Conn. Apr. 29, 2004) (stating that non-self-executing treaties such as 
CERD require domestic implementation, otherwise they are not judicially applicable). 
 68. CERD Declarations and Reservations, supra note 4, at 10 (―[B]efore any dispute to which the 
United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under 
this article, the specific consent of the United States is required in each case.‖).  
 69. McDougall, supra note 56, at 587. McDougall states that the RUDs the United States 
attached to CERD are similar to the ones it attached when ratifying the International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights and Convention Against Torture. Id. Overall, McDougall believes that the 
RUDs employ a ―practice of defensively isolating U.S. law and practice from meaningful international 
scrutiny.‖ Id. 
 70. Id. at 588–89. Legomsky notes that if the Human Rights Committee finds that a reservation is 
invalid, the party will be bound to the treaty notwithstanding the reservation. Legomsky, supra note 
60, at 187. The Human Rights Committee has questioned before whether any ―non-self-executing‖ 
RUDs comply with the objectives of human rights treaties. Id. However, if the non-self-executing 
RUDs are valid, the RUDs become part of the treaty with respect to U.S. obligations, and there is no 
private right of action under CERD. Id. 
 71. CERD Declarations and Reservations, supra note 4, at 10. The RUDs state in pertinent part: 
I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: 
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of 
individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United States 
does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under articles 4 and 7, to 
restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the extent 
that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.  
Id.  
 72. CERD, supra note 1, art. 1 para. 1. 
 73. McDougall, supra note 56, at 585–86. 
 74. Compare CERD, supra note 1, art. 2 para. 1(c) (―Each State Party shall take effective 
measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any 
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it 
exists.‖), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding that laws which use facially neutral 
language, even if they have the effect of discriminating against racial minorities, will be analyzed 
under rational basis review; in contrast, laws that are discriminatory on their face receive strict scrutiny 
review). See also McDougall, supra note 56, at 585–86. Many commentators believe that Article 2 of 
CERD affords greater protection against discrimination than the Fourteenth Amendment because of 
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protections against racial discrimination than the U.S. Constitution. In 
defense of the different standards between U.S. law and CERD, the United 
States has stated that it will evaluate claims of discrimination arising from 
neutral laws in limited contexts.
75
 In addition, laws may be struck down if 
circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the law has a disguised 
discriminatory intent.
76
 Some U.S. courts have noted that regardless of the 
provisions of CERD and whether they afford equal or greater protections 
than the U.S. Constitution, courts will not employ higher protections 
against racial profiling than those offered by the Constitution.
77
 
In its initial report to the Committee, the United States describes the 
improvements in race relations in the country over the past fifty years.
78
 In 
 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment‘s restrictive requirement of discriminatory intent. Id. at 585. In addition, 
McDougall notes that the use of the death penalty in the United States would be particularly affected 
by the full implementation of CERD because the death penalty has a large discriminatory impact on 
racial minorities in the United States. Id. at 585–86. The United States has not addressed these 
disparate impacts or the differences in protection offered by the Constitution and CERD in the RUDs. 
Id. 
 For an in-depth comparison of the protections offered by the U.S. Constitution and CERD, see 
Fellner, supra note 61, at 283–85. Fellner specifically notes: 
The requirements of a malign intent as well as a racially disparate effect for a finding of racial 
discrimination in United States constitutional jurisprudence differ from those in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
which the United States has ratified. In defining discrimination, the treaty decouples intent 
from impact. . . . Indeed, full compliance requires elimination of racial inequalities resulting 
from structural racism. 
Id. at 257–58. 
 75. U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. 
COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 106 (2007). 
 76. Id. Furthermore, 
It is also consistent with the standards used in litigation of equal protection claims under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, for which statistical proof of 
racial disparity, particularly when combined with other circumstantial evidence, is probative 
of the discriminatory intent necessary to make out a claim. In the view of the United States, 
article 1 (1) (c) does not impose obligations contrary to existing U.S. law. 
Id. 
 For a discussion of the requirements CERD imposes on its members states, see Fellner, supra note 
61, at 258 n.8. Fellner notes: 
The obligation to review and eliminate racial discrimination is not contingent on lawsuits by 
aggrieved individuals or groups or, indeed, on any petition to the congressional or legislative 
branches. CERD does, however, require State parties to ensure that ―competent national 
tribunals and other State institutions‖ offer effective protection and remedies against racial 
discrimination and to ensure that everyone has the right to seek reparation in court for 
damages suffered because of the discrimination. 
Id. 
 77. Gambaro v. United States, No. CA 06-391-ML, 2007 WL 2245907, at *7 (D.R.I. Aug. 2, 
2007) (―It follows that, irrespective of its provisions, the CERD cannot confer greater rights than those 
provided by the Constitution.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 78. Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, CERD, ¶ 71, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Initial Report], available at http://www.state 
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particular, the report notes the legislative action taken to remedy 
discrimination in employment of immigrants.
79
 The report does admit 
problems with enforcing Article V‘s prohibition against racial 
discrimination in the immigration context,
80
 yet nowhere in the report does 
the United States mention Brignoni specifically. The report uses vague 
language in admitting that ―[s]ome also contend that U.S. immigration law 
and policy is either implicitly or explicitly based on improper racial, ethnic 
and national criteria.‖81 
Since this initial report, the Committee has issued further observations 
that address several issues of U.S. adherence to the treaty.
82
 The 2008 
Committee notes in its Concluding Observations the continuing 
differences between the definition of discrimination in the U.S. judicial 
 
 
.gov/www/global/human_rights/cerd_report/cerd_index.html. For the text of U.S. reports to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, see U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, COMMITTEE ON 
THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (CERD) REPORT, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/cerd_ 
report/index.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
 In its Initial Report to the Committee, the United States once again reiterated the protections 
provided by the U.S. Constitution but noted that not all of CERD‘s provisions have been enacted. 
Initial Report, supra note 78, ¶ 71. The Initial Report notes that while racial discrimination has 
decreased since CERD‘s enactment, discrimination against immigrants remains: ―Whether legal or 
illegal, recent immigrants often encounter discrimination in employment, education and housing as a 
result of persistent racism and xenophobia. Some also contend that U.S. immigration law and policy is 
either implicitly or explicitly based on improper racial, ethnic and national criteria.‖ Id. ¶ 71(n).  
 79. Id. ¶ 103: 
Anti-discrimination Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. Sec 
1324b. This law was enacted in 1986 in response to concerns that employers, faced with 
sanctions against knowingly hiring unauthorized immigrants, would refuse to hire people they 
perceived to be foreign, based on their accents or appearances. The law prohibits citizenship 
status and national origin discrimination with respect to hiring, firing, or referral or 
recruitment for a fee. The law also prohibits unfair documentary practices with respect to 
employment eligibility verification. All U.S. citizens and nationals and work-authorized 
immigrants are protected from national origin discrimination and unfair documentary 
practices. U.S. citizens and nationals, permanent residents, asylees, refugees, and temporary 
residents are protected from citizenship status discrimination. 
 80. Initial Report, supra note 78, ¶ 71(n). 
 81. Id. In a later report the U.S. Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Secretary of State to 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination cited Whren as an example of a 
―safeguard‖ against racial profiling. Glover, supra note 18, at 28. Due to the legacy of Whren, some 
believe these officials cited Whren by mistake. Id. However, the officials might have believed that 
Whren complies with CERD by declaring racial profiling illegal and have simply ignored how the 
ruling increased power of police to use traffic violations as a pretext for illegal stops.  
 82. See generally Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: United States of America, CERD, July 30–Aug. 17, 2001, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
ICERD/C/59/Misc.17/Rev 3 (Aug. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Concluding Observations 2001]; see also 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, United States of America, 
CERD, 72d Sess., Feb. 18–Mar. 7, 2008, U.N. Doc. ICERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter 
Concluding Observations 2008].  
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system and the definition of discrimination in CERD; the restrictive RUDs 
adopted by the United States in signing CERD; disparities in 
representation, treatment, and sentencing of racial minorities in the 
criminal justice system;
83
 and problems with domestic implementation of 
CERD.
84
 The permitted use of race in criminal immigration enforcement is 
not mentioned in the Committee‘s observations.85 NGOs have conducted 
separate studies and issued ―shadow reports,‖86 finding that the U.S. 
obligations under CERD are not understood domestically and full 
implementation is unlikely.
87
 Overall, there has been no explicit 
implementation of CERD domestically, and U.S. courts have not 
employed any of the heightened protections against racial discrimination 
in CERD that rise above the lower U.S. constitutional protections, such as 
the CERD protections of minorities from laws that discriminate facially 
and in effect.
88
 While most international courts and countries have not 
 
 
 83. Concluding Observations 2008, supra note 82; see also Fellner, supra note 61, at 285–89.  
 84. Concluding Observations 2008, supra note 82, ¶ 36 (2008). The Concluding Observations 
comment that the United States should 
organize public awareness and education programmes on the Convention and its provisions, 
and step up its efforts to make government officials, the judiciary, federal and state law 
enforcement officials, teachers, social workers and the public in general aware about the 
responsibilities of the State party under the Convention, as well as the mechanisms and 
procedures provided for by the Convention in the field of racial discrimination and 
intolerance. 
Id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Race in America, 72 ALBANY L. REV. 999, 1024–
25 (2009). 
 87. Fellner, supra note 61, at 260 n.15 (―In 2007, Human Rights Watch contacted the attorneys 
general of each state; not one of them was aware of CERD and their obligations under it.‖). One 
academic notes:  
A coalition of non-governmental organizations, activists, and academics used the opportunity 
created by the U.S. submission of its 2007 periodic report to the U.N. on the ICERD to 
highlight racial discrimination in the U.S. The shadow report critiques the inadequacies of the 
U.S. official report and places ―domestic‖ issues such as Katrina, racial profiling, prison 
conditions, abuses against immigrants, education, housing, and health care, indigenous 
peoples' rights, the rights of women of color, sexual orientation, and other issues on the 
international agenda. 
Lewis, supra note 86, at 1024–25. 
 88. See supra note 55. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg utilized Article 2, Section 2 of CERD in 
her concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306, 344–47 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
Article 2, Section 2 states, in relevant part, that State Parties shall take ―special and concrete measures 
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to 
them.‖ Id. at 344; CERD, supra note 1, art. 2, § 2. Justice Ginsburg used Article 2, Section 2 of CERD 
to justify the Court‘s ruling upholding the policy of the University of Michigan Law School. See 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344. The policy allowed consideration of the race of applicants when admitting 
students in order to ensure that minority students were admitted to the school. See id. While the use of 
international law in Supreme Court opinions is rare, Justice Ginsburg appears to have used CERD as 
support for her view that some remedial forms of racial discrimination could be constitutional. Id. See 
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decided cases of racial discrimination based solely on CERD, many 
countries consider CERD to have persuasive authority when deciding 
applicable cases.
89
  
In Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights of Fundamental Freedoms (―European Convention on Human 
Rights‖) established the European Court of Human Rights,90 which 
decides cases based on the rights in the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
91
 The court also considers other international law, including 
CERD. In the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia,
92
 a non-citizen of Latvia was 
subjected to a different set of pension restrictions than Latvian citizens.
93
 
The majority did not consider CERD; however, a dissenting justice 
considered Section 2 of Article 1 of CERD and determined that, in the 
context of pensions, parties to CERD have the right to differentiate 
between citizens.
94
 Similar to U.S. cases,
95
 CERD was not utilized as 
mandatory authority in Andrejeva, although Latvia is a party to the 
treaty.
96
 
 
 
also McDougall, supra note 56, at 584 (finding that ―ICERD carves out from the definition of racial 
discrimination the possibility of extensive affirmative action programs‖). 
 89. See A and others v. Sec‘y of State for the Home Dep‘t, [2004] UKHL 56 (H.L.) [63] (appeal 
taken from Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/ 
a&others.pdf. Lord Bingham cites to a number of international law sources and notes that none of the 
law is binding on the United Kingdom. Id. However, Lord Bingham notes that the United Kingdom 
ratified CERD and the international law he cites is ―inimical to the submission that a state may 
lawfully discriminate against foreign nationals by detaining them but not nationals presenting the same 
threat.‖ Id. 
 90. See European Convention of the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
arts. 19–51, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 297. 
 93. Id. ¶ 3. The applicant was a citizen of the USSR and had been born in Kazakhstan. After the 
dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the applicant became a permanent resident, non-citizen of Latvia 
where she had lived since the age of twelve. Id. When the applicant applied for her pension upon 
retirement, the Latvian government refused to count towards her pension the time the applicant worked 
in Latvia for a company based in Kiev and Moscow. Id. If the applicant had been a citizen, the time 
would have been counted. Id. 
 94. Id. ¶ 38 (Ziemele, J., dissenting in part). The justice finds the pension context to be 
compelling enough to justify differentiating between citizens and non-citizens. Id. Relating CERD to 
other influential international law, the justice notes: 
It is true that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has construed this 
exception strictly but none of the developments in human rights law, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights, have abolished the sovereign right of a State to impose 
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens in so far as their purpose or effect contains no 
element of discrimination based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 95. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344; see also supra note 67. 
 96. See CERD Declarations and Reservations, supra note 4. 
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The United Kingdom, when determining the validity of detaining 
individuals after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
97
 also reviewed the allowance in 
Section 2 of Article 1 to treat non-citizens differently from citizens.
98
 The 
court noted that while the allowance might seem to exempt discrimination 
against non-citizens from the scope of treaty, the Committee still inquires 
into whether there was a disparate impact on non-citizens based on the 
illicit criteria.
99
 However the court, like the European Court of Human 
Rights and the U.S. courts, did not use CERD in its official holding.
100
 
These U.S., European Court of Human Rights, and U.K. cases make 
clear that while CERD allows parties to distinguish based on citizenship, 
the Committee will not tolerate any act that borders on discrimination, 
even in effect. It is possible that parties to the treaty have not included a 
CERD analysis in their official jurisprudence in order to avoid evaluating 
whether their immigration laws and other laws that distinguish based on 
citizenship actually discriminate. 
Regarding S.B. 1070 specifically, the drafters could have been trying to 
distinguish between citizen and non-citizen status by using race as one of 
many rational factors employed to quickly evaluate an individual‘s 
citizenship status near the border.
101
 By adopting the Brignoni criteria 
through the clause ―to the extent of the United States Constitution,‖102 S.B. 
 
 
 97. A and others, [2004] UKHL 56 (H.L.) [63] ¶¶ 6–7.  
 98. Id. ¶ 62. 
 99. Id. Lord Bingham referred to the General Recommendation 14 adopted by the Committee, 
which states: 
The Committee observes that a differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination 
if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the 
Convention. In considering the criteria that may have been employed, the Committee will 
acknowledge that particular actions may have varied purposes. In seeking to determine 
whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, it will look to see whether that 
action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin. 
Id. See also General Recommendation XI: Non-citizens (Art. 1), U.N. HIGH COMM‘R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Mar. 19, 1993), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/7b38ac12b0986d86c1256 
3ee004a8af0?Opendocument. In 2004, the Committee updated its comments on non-citizens and 
added that states must ―[c]ombat ill-treatment of and discrimination against non-citizens by police and 
other law enforcement agencies and civil servants by strictly applying relevant legislation and 
regulations providing for sanctions and by ensuring that all officials dealing with non-citizens receive 
special training, including training in human rights.‖ General Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination 
Against Non-citizens, U.N. COMM‘R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. ¶ 21 (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.unhcr 
.org/refworld/docid/45139e084.html. 
 100. A and others, [2004] UKHL 56 (H.L.) [63] ¶ 63. 
 101. Similarly, Latvia could have been distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens in its 
pension program as an efficient way to cut down on pension costs. Andrejeva, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 297. 
 102. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 
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1070 seems to push against, if not cross over, the line between distinctions 
based on race and discrimination. If S.B. 1070 does violate CERD, the 
next question is whether the situation in Arizona justifies or necessitates 
racial profiling, and, if so, whether the United States should withdraw 
from the treaty.  
V. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RACIAL PROFILING IN IMMIGRATION 
LAW 
Particularly in the immigration context, scholars have grappled with the 
advantages and disadvantages of racial profiling. While the correlation 
between illegal immigration and a Hispanic race may be higher than the 
correlation between criminal behavior, such as drug dealing, and a 
minority race, such as African American,
103
 the same costs associated with 
racial profiling of African Americans and other minorities in the criminal 
context exist with the racial profiling of immigrants. When weighing the 
costs and benefits of racial profiling in immigration, scholarship on 
profiling of minorities can provide useful information on the effects 
profiling can and likely will have on immigrants at the Arizona-Mexico 
border.
104
 
One of the strongest arguments in favor of racial profiling is that the 
use of a profile, while it may violate constitutional rights of citizens and 
non-citizens, can make police work more efficient and effective.
105
 
Profiling advocates contend that randomly selecting drivers to stop at a 
checkpoint instead of using a profile could waste time and effort, just as 
stopping an elderly European woman at the airport would likely be 
fruitless if she has none of the characteristics of a terrorist profile.
106
 
Supporters of racial profiling could also use as support the statistics that 
 
 
 103. This argument draws comparisons from Pampel‘s argument that ―a stronger connection exists 
between Middle Eastern Muslim background and terrorism than the connection between race and drug 
distribution.‖ PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 23. 
 104. See infra notes 115–17, 123 and accompanying text. 
 105. PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 8. Pampel suggests that the best way to deal with the benefits and 
costs of racial profiling is to balance the protection of individual rights and the interest in fighting 
crime. Id. Pampel suggests that liberals tend to push for protecting individual rights while 
conservatives tend to side with fighting crime, although politicians on both sides take a stance against 
racial profiling. Id. 
 106. Id. at 29. Pampel makes the ―common sense‖ argument that law enforcement should not 
waste time on investigating individuals whose background is not associated with any type of illegal 
activity. Id. He also notes that empirical data demonstrates that in New Jersey, when the police ceased 
their use of a felony-offender profile because of the risk of ―inappropriate stereotype,‖ drug charges 
from police stops dropped dramatically. Id. at 30. However, murder rates, which are related to drug 
trafficking, increased in certain cities during the same period. Id. 
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show a higher criminal arrest rate for minorities;
107
 however, instead of 
these statistics supporting racial profiling tactics, racial profiling could be 
the cause of the high rate of minority arrests.
108
 Many minorities, both 
citizens and non-citizens, suffer from economic discrimination, language 
barriers, and lack of general opportunity to succeed in America.
109
 On the 
other hand, law enforcement officers argue that they must continue to fight 
crime regardless of the race of the perpetrators and cannot remedy the 
large social injustices that minorities face.
110
 
While some of the disadvantages of racial profiling might seem 
intuitive, ―[p]rofiling may violate the civil rights of minority groups, 
reduce public support for the police, and ultimately increase crime.‖111 
Racial profiling may offend the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
clause, which has been used to strike down distinctions that laws make 
based on race.
112
 The Supreme Court has found that constitutional 
protections apply to non-citizens within the United States;
113
 therefore, 
some scholars believe that racial classifications used to curb immigration 
could be invalid under the Equal Protection clause.
114
 
 
 
 107. Id. at 26. 
 108. Id. at 34. The arrests rates in a way become a ―self-fulfilling prophecy.‖ Id. The same 
argument would not apply to Hispanics since, with or without profiling, most of the illegal immigrants 
at the Arizona-Mexico border will be Hispanic; other criticisms, however, still affect the usefulness of 
the Hispanic profile. 
 109. Id. at 24. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 4. With regards to the first concern, racial profiling can have significant psychological 
affects on its targets, similar to post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 37. These psychological effects 
can lead minorities to dress differently, travel to different areas, drive different cars, and shop 
differently in reaction to profiling. Id. Scholars have commented that racial profiling can create a 
feeling of unequal treatment and second-class citizenship among the targeted group, whether the group 
has done something illegal or not. The Case Against Race Profiling, supra note 45, at 717–18. Johnson 
draws connections between the targeting of Hispanics in current immigration law to the Chinese 
exclusion laws of the 1800s, Japanese internment during World War II, strict quota systems on 
immigration from eastern and southern Europe in the twentieth century, restrictions on African 
immigration, and seemingly racially-oriented refugee and asylum laws. Id. Johnson‘s comparisons 
draw compelling similarities between these past racially-motivated policies and Brignoni‘s expansion 
of immigration enforcement power. 
 112. See id. at 719 n.242 and accompanying text.  
 113. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1981) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
all persons within a state); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885) (―‗Nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‘ These provisions are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, 
of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.‖). 
 114. See Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling, supra note 45, at 720–21. Johnson notes that 
the Supreme Court held in Brignoni and during the time of Chinese exclusion that the Plenary Power 
doctrine did not override the constitutional rights of people within the U.S. borders. Id. at 721. 
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Additionally, the open use of racial profiling increases distrust towards 
law enforcement and decreases assimilation and naturalization.
115
 In the 
immigration context, border patrol officers claim to focus efforts on 
curbing commercial smuggling, yet smugglers can avoid the Border Patrol 
by employing non-Hispanic drivers.
116
 For example, drug dealers in 
California have used non-Hispanic teenagers as drug runners.
117
 Since 
offenders have continuously adapted to racial profiling by law 
enforcement, some police profiles have become completely contradictory 
or include so many elements that every driver or airplane passenger fits the 
profile.
118
 Minorities are so accustomed to being disproportionately 
targeted by police that terms such as ―driving while black,‖119 ―driving 
while Mexican,‖120 and ―flying while Arab‖121 have now become part of 
the English vernacular.
122
 
 
 
 115. Id. at 716. 
 116. Id. at 711. 
 117. See Booth & Miroff, supra note 14. 
 118. PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 35–36. For example, some of the elements of an airplane 
passenger profile include passengers who ―arrived late at night, arrived early in the morning, [or] 
arrived in the afternoon,‖ passengers who were ―one of the first to deplane, one of the last to deplane, 
[or] deplaned in the middle,‖ and passengers who ―walked quickly through the [the] airport, walked 
slowly through [the] airport, [or] walked aimlessly through [the] airport.‖ Id. at 36. 
 119. See generally David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The 
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997). Harris 
analyzes the effects of the Supreme Court decision in Whren and notes that police can use traffic 
violations to stop disproportionate amounts of African Americans under the pretext of a traffic stop; 
however, police were already stopping disproportionate numbers before Whren. Id. at 546. Harris 
states, 
In fact, the stopping of black drivers, just to see what officers can find, has become so 
common in some places that this practice has its own name: African-Americans sometimes 
say they have been stopped for the offense of ―driving while black.‖ With Whren, we should 
expect African-Americans and Hispanics to experience an even greater number of pretextual 
traffic stops. And once police stop a car, they often search it, either by obtaining consent, 
using a drug sniffing dog, or by some other means. In fact, searching cars for narcotics is 
perhaps the major motivation for making these stops. 
Id. 
 120. See generally Romero, supra note 34 (describing the origins and uses of the terms). 
 121. See Legomsky, supra note 60, at 178. 
 122. See PAMPEL, supra note 26, at 26. Pampel notes: 
The figures for 2000 . . . disclose that 27.9 percent of all persons arrested are black and 69.7 
are white. Further, of all persons arrested for weapons violations, 36.8 percent are black and 
61.3 are white; of all persons arrested for drug abuse violations, 34.5 percent are black and 
64.2 percent are white; and of all persons arrested for murder, 48.8 are black and 48.7 are 
white. Although white arrests outnumber black arrests, blacks make up about 13 percent and 
whites (including Hispanics) make up about 82 percent of the population. 
Id. In addition, the ―hit rates,‖ the percentage of police searches in which drugs are found, is 6.2% for 
blacks and 6.7% for whites. Id. at 35. Hit rates for Hispanics are much lower at 2.8%. Id. 
 Pampel finds that profiling can adversely affect the entire judicial system because jurors, whether 
or not profiling victims themselves, may acquit a guilty defendant if they suspect that the accused was 
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Lastly, some believe that state endorsement of racial profiling leads to 
greater private discrimination and racial hostility, such as the rise of 
private citizens enforcing borders in the Southwest.
123
 The government‘s 
acceptance of private discrimination and discrimination in law 
enforcement could be one impetus for Arizona‘s increase in anti-
immigrant sentiment. 
The concerns that could arise from racial profiling in immigration 
enforcement through a law like S.B. 1070 are two-fold. Not only will legal 
permanent residents and U.S. citizens of Hispanic descent be singled out 
by a law like S.B. 1070, but Hispanic non-citizens will also be treated 
differently from other non-citizens. Even if profiling could be rational in a 
situation like that in Arizona, rational racial profiling laws are not always 
justified laws.
124
  
While racial profiling may not be a preferable enforcement tactic, the 
situation in Arizona has become heated and contentious,
125
 and the 
benefits of racial profiling could outweigh the costs. Clashes occur 
between citizen militias and immigrants crossing the border, and the 
effects of the out-of-control drug regimes in Mexico spill into the United 
States.
126
 The United States should weigh the costs and benefits of 
profiling to determine what steps it can to take in Arizona. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If S.B. 1070 truly discriminates based on race, then the United States 
would be required to strike down the legislation to remain compliant with 
CERD.
127
 Striking down this legislation would also be an implicit 
overruling of Brignoni, which would be a considerable step to take in 
recognizing international law. However, there are benefits to complying 
with CERD, including increasing perceptions of U.S. legitimacy, 
bolstering the image of the United States as a nation that respects 
international consensus on certain human rights issues, and fully 
 
 
racially profiled. Id. at 38. Occasionally entire cases will need to be dismissed and convictions 
overturned because of racial profiling. Id. The state most affected judicially by racial profiling is most 
likely New Jersey. Id. New Jersey has had to overturn convictions, has been subjected to federal 
investigations, and has faced litigation for its extensive use of profiling. Id.  
 123. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling, supra note 45, at 732–35. 
 124. Legomsky, supra note 60, at 178. 
 125. Arizona Immigration Conflict Heats Up, CBS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.cbsnews 
.com/stories/2010/04/26/national/main6434031.shtml. 
 126. See Booth & Miroff, supra note 14. 
 127. CERD, supra note 1, art. 2, § 1(c) (―Each State Party shall . . . rescind or nullify any laws and 
regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.‖). 
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implementing a treaty that delineates a clear line regarding the use of race 
in legislation and law enforcement tactics. From a legitimacy and public 
policy perspective, the United States may wish to both admit its 
shortcomings and make advances towards meeting the provisions of 
CERD. Implementation could be most important in Arizona where the 
provisions of CERD are most directly at odds with local law.  
In the alternative, the United States could remain a party to the treaty 
but decline to apply the treaty solely in Arizona. The United States could 
frame the situation in terms of an emergency for which extreme policies 
are needed. Lastly, if the United States has no intention of following 
CERD and elevating protections from racial profiling above the current 
constitutional protections, the United States should withdraw from CERD. 
The United States gains little by remaining a party to a treaty with which it 
does not comply. Backing out of the treaty could raise questions about 
United States‘ dedication to fighting discrimination; however, the United 
States should stand by its constitutional jurisprudence if it believes its laws 
provide adequate protection for individual rights and are flexible enough 
to handle extreme situations such as that in Arizona. 
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